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Abstract—This paper presents a complex systems
overview of a power grid network. In recent years, concerns
about the robustness of the power grid have grown because
of several cascading outages in different parts of the world.
In this paper, cascading effect has been simulated on
three different networks, the IEEE 300 bus test system,
the IEEE 118 bus test system, and the WSCC 179 bus
equivalent model. Power Degradation has been discussed as
a measure to estimate the damage to the network, in terms
of load loss and node loss. A network generator has been
developed to generate graphs with characteristics similar
to the IEEE standard networks and the generated graphs
are then compared with the standard networks to show
the effect of topology in determining the robustness of a
power grid. Three mitigation strategies, Homogeneous Load
Reduction, Targeted Range-Based Load Reduction, and
Use of Distributed Renewable Sources in combination with
Islanding, have been suggested. The Homogeneous Load
Reduction is the simplest to implement but the Targeted
Range-Based Load Reduction is the most effective strategy.
Index Terms—Cascading Effect, Power Degradation,
Node Loss, Mitigation Strategies
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that power grids are among the
largest and most complex technological systems ever de-
veloped [1]. The power grid can be represented by a
large graph belonging to a special family of graphs called
complex networks. As is the case with most networks, the
edges are not costless [2], so there is no node or group of
nodes that prevail over the others, and the distribution can
be fitted by an exponential function [3]. However, if we
calculate the load on each node, we observe that although
the network is not very heterogeneous in the node degree,
it shows high heterogeneity in the node load. Most of the
nodes handle a small load but there are a few nodes that
have to carry an extremely high load [3]. The same is
true for links also. Thus, some nodes and links tend to
become more important than the others and an intentional
or accidental removal of these elements can lead to the
collapse of the entire network. Such incidents have taken
place in history, such as the one on August 10, 1996 when
a 1300 MW electrical line in Southern Oregon sagged in
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summer heat, initiating a chain reaction that cut power to
more than four million people in eleven Western States [4],
[5]. Another example is the incident of August 14, 2003
when an initial disturbance in Ohio [6] led to the largest
blackout in the history of the United States and millions of
people throughout parts of North Eastern and Mid Western
United States, and Ontario, Canada, were without power
for as long as fifteen hours.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
defines a cascading failure as “The uncontrolled loss of
any system facilities or load, whether because of thermal
overload, voltage collapse, or loss of synchronism, except
those occurring as a result of fault isolation [7].” The power
grid network is different from other complex networks in
that the flow dynamics depend greatly on the electrical
characteristics, such as the impedances of the transmission
lines. Power flows along the least resistive path, and thus
the amount of power flowing through the transmission lines
is inversely proportional to their impedances.
If a single line gets overloaded or breaks, its power is
immediately shifted to a different line and the disturbance
can be suspended. However, if the redistribution of power
leads to the subsequent overloading of other lines, the
consequence could be a cascade of overloading failures.
In section II, we discuss research and work related to
the topological analysis of the power grid. In section III,
we describe the simulator that we developed to study the
cascading effect on power grid networks. We analyze the
IEEE 300 bus test system [8], the IEEE 118 bus test
system [8], and the WSCC 179 bus equivalent system for
cascading failures using the DC Power Flow Model [9].
The redistribution of power is dependent on the electrical
characteristics, such as impedances, of transmission lines.
The resistances of the lines have been neglected because
they are very small as compared to their inductive reac-
tances [9]. In section IV, we discuss a Network Generator
that we developed to generate a family of power grid
networks with characteristics such as number of nodes,
average node degree, and maximum node degree, same as
the standard networks but with random connections. We
then compare the different network metrics of the standard
and generated graphs to determine the effect of topology
on their robustness. We investigate mitigation strategies
for cascading failures in Section V. The results, and con-
clusions, along with future work have been presented in
sections VI and VII, respectively.
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II. RELATED WORK
The United States Department of Energy states that
the future of the power grid in the United States includes
expansion, updating, and implementation of the Smart
Grid [10], along with the improvement in robustness of
the already existing network. The complete implementation
of the smart grid would bring about a revolution in the
way the power industry works today. Distributed renewable
energy will be an integral part of the smart grid [10] to help
meet the demand of future energy needs. Current research
is geared towards the study of renewable energy and its
use to improve the efficiency of the smart grid. While the
use of technology and advanced communication methods
is one of the ways to improve the resilience and robustness
of the power grids, modeling the grid as a complex system
and analyzing its topology to determine robustness is also
a way. Methods for modeling the power grid as a complex
network have developed to a point where the vastness and
complexity of the grid can be realized in a simulation [11],
[12].
The authors of [13] have mentioned that energy travels
between a set of nodes using the shortest path and that the
load on a node is the total number of shortest paths passing
through that node. As a result, the load distribution changes
with change in the network, with ER random graphs
having an exponential load distribution and BA networks
exhibiting a power law distribution in the node load. The
analysis is completely based on node capacity without any
mention of the link (transmission line)characteristics and
is based on single node failures.
In [14], the authors discuss a hidden-failure embedded
transmission network model to explore the characteris-
tics of cascading events. The impacts of various model
parameters on the system dynamics are examined, and
the corresponding mitigation strategies are also suggested.
They suggest that the cascading failures arising due to
single element failure are actually supplemented by hidden
failures, which are exposed only in case of faults.
In this paper, we analyze power grid networks with respect
to redistribution of flows, and failure of links due to over-
loading. We compare the characteristics of IEEE standard
networks with generated networks to show how topology
can affect the robustness of a network. The generated
graphs are obtained by keeping the number of nodes, aver-
age node degree, and maximum node degree same as the
standard graphs but by connecting links randomly. Keeping
the topology same as the standard, some mitigation strate-
gies can be applied to the networks to reduce cascading
effects. We have discussed such mitigation strategies, based
on load reduction, for the power grid networks.
III. CASCADING EFFECT IN A POWER GRID
To analyze the effect of topological characteristics
of the power grid network on cascading failures, we have
used networks such as the IEEE 300 bus test system [8],
the IEEE 118 bus test system [8], and the WSCC 179
bus equivalent system. The buses in the power grid are
referred to as nodes, the transmission lines as links, and
the impedances of the transmission lines as weights on
the links. The 300 node network consists of 247 nodes
plus two smaller subsections of nodes which are not well
connected with the main graph. These two subsections
were not critical for the analysis from a topological view
point and thus were not included. Therefore, the 300 node
network will be referred to as the 247 node network here
onwards unless we refer to the standard test case. After
the initial failure, some of the links get overloaded and
fail. This represents the first stage of cascade. The first
stage leads to further overloading of more links and their
collapse, constituting the second stage and so on. In this
way, the systems go through multiple stages of cascade
before they finally stabilize and there are no more failures.
We categorized the links into two types - vulnerable and
non-vulnerable - depending upon whether they cause more
or less than ten percent damage upon removal. Damage
represents both, the loss in connectivity and the loss of
load. Approximately 41.97% of the links in the 247 nodes
network were found to be vulnerable and the remaining
58.03% were non-vulnerable links. We use Power Degra-
dation as a measure to determine the severity of damage to
the network as a result of initial failure. Power Degradation
is the fall in the total load of the system as compared to
the original load. We also compare the networks in terms
of the number of nodes lost by the failure of a vulnerable
link.
Fig. 1. 247 Nodes Original (left) and Generated Networks
IV. NETWORK GENERATION AND ANALYSIS
To analyze the effect of topological characteristics
of power grid networks on cascading effect, we use the
standard networks such as the IEEE 300 bus [8], IEEE
118 bus [8], and WSCC 179 bus networks as the first
stage and study cascading failures on them. Then we
design a first approximation network generator to produce
networks having characteristics like number of nodes,
maximum node degree, and average node degree similar
to the original networks. Fig. 1, 2, and 3 show the original
and generated networks for the 247 node, the 179 node,
Fig. 2. 179 Nodes Original (left) and Generated Networks
and the 118 node systems, respectively. Fig. 4 shows the
node degree distributions of the 247 node original and
generated networks. This figure shows that the generated
network follows the node degree distribution of the original
network closely. The horizontal axis represents the degree
from 1 to the maximum node degree, which is 8 in case
of the 247 node network, and the vertical axis represents
the number of nodes with a particular node degree. The
generated graph is one of those from the family of random
graphs having the node degree distribution similar to the
original network. The generator takes the number of nodes,
the maximum node degree, and the average node degree as
inputs and gives the edge list of the network as the output.
The edge list is a list which contains pairs of vertices that
every edge connects. These generated networks are then
used for the simulation of cascading effect. We generated
the weights and loads probabilistically from measured in-
ductance and load distributions. Fig. 5 shows the graphs for
power degradation on the 247 node original and generated
networks. The horizontal axis represents the stages of
cascade that the system goes through, before it finally
stabilizes, and the vertical axis is the current load on the
system in megawatt. An important observation to be made
here is that as the load-carrying nodes get disconnected
from the network, the total load on the network keeps
reducing. As indicated by Fig. 5, the original network
loses nodes gradually, and so stabilization is achieved at a
much later stage than the generated network, which loses
the excess load quickly. Thus, this improvement in the
amount of power degradation can be safely attributed to
the generated topology of the power grid. Fig. 6 shows
the graph for node loss in the 247 node original and
generated networks. The horizontal axis again represents
the stages of cascade and the vertical axis represents the
number of nodes remaining in the network, as a result
of cascading. Table I shows the comparison between
different characteristics of the original and the generated
networks. The table indicates that the generated networks
have a shorter characteristic path length as compared to the
original. This metric causes the generated networks to be
better connected and hence contribute to the robustness
Fig. 3. 118 Nodes Original (left) and Generated Networks
Fig. 4. Node Degree Distribution of the 247 Nodes Original and
Generated Networks
Fig. 5. Power Degradation Graphs for the 247 Nodes Original and
Generated Networks
Fig. 6. Node Loss Graphs for the 247 Nodes Original and Generated
Networks
TABLE I
DIFFERENCES IN CHARACTERISTICS OF ORIGINAL AND GENERATED
NETWORKS
Network Nodes Char Path Length Clustering Coefficient
247 9.646 0.102
Original 179 12.382 0.089
118 6.309 0.165
247 5.361 0.004
Generated 179 5.549 0.010
118 4.385 0.020
of the networks. However, the clustering coefficient of
the generated networks is lower than that of the original
networks due to the more random nature of the graph in
the generated case. Therefore, we can say that there is
less local connectivity due to smaller clustering coefficient
but higher degree of global connectivity due to shorter
characteristic path length.
V. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
We propose the following mitigation strategies to
limit the damage to the network by cascading failures: Ho-
mogeneous Load Reduction, Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction, and Islanding with use of Distributed Renew-
able Sources. The third strategy aims at optimally selecting
clusters or islands of nodes that can be separated from the
main grid and be independently powered using distributed
sources such as wind turbines. Each of these strategies is
discussed in detail.
A. Homogeneous Load Reduction
This mitigation strategy aims at reducing a given
percentage of the load on each of the nodes in the network,
after the initial failure. This reduction in load attempts to
keep the nodes and links operating below their maximum
capacities and to better accommodate the redistribution of
load due to failure of links or nodes. We performed a
series of simulations on the original 247 node network,
in which the load on each of the nodes was reduced from
hundred percent to zero percent, in steps of five. We plotted
the result of each simulation for the original 247 node
network to obtain the Homogeneous Load Reduction curve
as shown in the Fig. 7. Each point on the horizontal axis is
a separate simulation with the starting load for each being
the initial load on the nodes. As Fig. 7 shows, we get
a connected component with most of the nodes within the
component at about 10% load reduction on all the nodes of
the network. However, the total protection of the network
is achieved at about 80% reduction.
B. Targeted Range-Based Load Reduction
If we select a node from the network and follow
it along the adjacent nodes considering any one direction
of power flow, we discover a tree for that node. The
approach used in this strategy is to select one of the nodes
connected to the link that failed, and discover the tree for
Fig. 7. Homogeneous Load Reduction and Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction
that node. The node being considered is the one which was
sending power out to the other node through the failed
link. This particular node has to re-route the outgoing
power among its other connected neighbors. One or more
of the neighbors of this root node may have their best way
to the generator through it. These neighbors form a part
of the tree. The same criterion is followed at every step
until the entire tree is discovered. The tree stops either at
a leaf node or at a source. Leaf nodes are nodes at the
edge of the network. We then consider nodes in the tree
which are not sources or which handle load, and reduce
their load by a certain percentage. Since we consider a
smaller set of nodes in this strategy, as compared to the
Homogeneous Load Reduction, it constitutes a very small
portion of the total load of the system, less than 2%. Fig.
7 shows the comparison between the Homogeneous Load
Reduction Strategy and the Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction strategy. Fig. 8 shows the load reduction only
on the targeted tree.
Fig. 8. Load Reduction on the Tree - Targeted Range-Based Load
Reduction Strategy
C. Islanding with use of Distributed Renewable Sources
The aim of this strategy is to disconnect a cluster
or “island” of nodes from the main grid to help reduce
the load on the grid. This island will be powered by some
distributed renewable sources such as wind turbines. The
power output of each of the turbines is the theoretical
load reduction on the transmission lines of the power grid.
We are investigating some optimization techniques which
could be used to disconnect the island from the main grid.
VI. RESULTS
The following results were obtained from the dis-
cussions above:
• The power degradation graphs in Fig. 5 show that
the worst-case cascading effect stops at an earlier
stage and causes less damage in the case of generated
networks. The load loss in the case of the 247 node
generated network discussed above is about 42.66%
less and the node loss is about 36.84% less than the
original network.
• As seen from Table I, the generated graphs have a
smaller characteristic path length as compared to the
real networks. This property of the generated networks
makes them more robust against cascading failures.
However, the clustering coefficient of the generated
networks is lower than that of the original networks,
due to more random nature of the generated networks.
• The Homogeneous Strategy is easier to implement,
in that we simply reduce the load on all the nodes
existing in the network. The Range-Based Load Re-
duction strategy is more economical, but requires
cyber-physical system interaction to perform quick
computations and reduce the load in only the desired
regions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The topology of the power grid network greatly
contributes to its robustness. The topology determines the
connectivity of the network and hence the number of
alternate paths that can be taken by the network flow.
The generated graphs are better connected because of
shorter characteristic path lengths and are more random
in nature than the real power grid networks. As a result of
randomness, they show more robustness against cascading
failures. However, the feasibility of having shorter charac-
teristic path lengths in a real power grid network, must be
investigated. The distributed renewable sources can be of
great assistance in reducing the ever-increasing load on the
power grid. Our future work includes the following:
• Using optimization techniques to obtain feasible
points for disconnection of node clusters for Islanding,
and
• Weighted Analysis of the power grid network to study
the deviation of the optimal paths from the shortest
paths.
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